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THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT: A 
MEANS TO CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR AIDING 
AND ABETTING TORTURE 
Jessica Grunberg+ 
Exposure to mustard gas can cause the skin to burn and blister.1  As the 
poison travels into the body, it also attacks the eyes, respiratory functions, and 
digestion—often making it painful or impossible to see or breathe.2  Saddam 
Hussein’s regime used mustard gas to attack Kurdish cities in 1988, killing and 
injuring thousands of people.3  In one of several assaults authorized by 
Hussein, those exposed to the poison “reported symptoms including difficulty 
breathing, watery eyes, vomiting, fainting, chemical burns, and blindness 
immediately after the attacks, as well as ongoing physical and psychological 
disabilities.”4 
The mustard gas used in attacks against the Kurds required the ingredient 
thiodiglycol (TDG), a chemical manufactured by the Baltimore-based 
company Alcolac, Inc. (Alcolac).5  Victims later sued Alcolac under the 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), which provides civil remedies 
against any “individual” who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.6  
Although Alcolac allegedly supplied TDG to Iraq in violation of the TVPA,7 
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., B.J., 2009, The University of Missouri.  The author wishes to thank Professor Geoffrey 
Watson for his guidance and expertise.  The author also wishes to thank her family and friends for 
their love and support. 
 1. Facts About Sulfur Mustard, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sulfurmustard/basic/facts.asp (last updated Mar. 12, 2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Aziz v. Republic of Iraq, No. MJG-09-869, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 143164, at *4 (D. 
Md. June 9, 2010), aff’d No. 10-1908, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19227 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 2011).  
Hussein’s attack on the Kurdish village Halabja is considered the worst attack of his deadly 
campaign—the use of mustard gas killed 5000 people “and left 65,000 others with severe skin 
and respiratory diseases, abnormal rates of cancer and birth defects, and a devastated 
environment.”  Mustard Gas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/iraq/mustard-
gas/p9551 (May 28, 2008).  This incursion was one of the approximately 280 chemical attacks 
carried out against the Kurdish people under Hussein’s regime. Id. 
 4. Aziz, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 143164, at *4–5. 
 5. Id. at *4.  Alcolac was a subsidiary corporation of the British conglomerate Rio Tinto 
Zinc.  Id. at *3. 
 6. Id. at *5; see Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 
Stat. 73, 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
 7. Aziz, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 143164, at *3–4.  According to the plaintiffs, the Iraqi 
government solicited various companies for chemical warfare components, but most declined to 
supply the ingredients.  Id. at *2–3.  Alcolac, however, “manufactured and sold more than one 
million pounds of TDG” to a corporation that shipped the chemical to Europe before it ultimately 
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the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the 
victims’ complaint against the company, and held that corporations are not 
subject to liability under the TVPA because they do not qualify as 
“individuals.”8  The Fourth Circuit subsequently affirmed this interpretation, 
and noted that expanding the term “individuals” to include corporations would 
require a “schizophrenic construction of the TVPA.”9  The Second, Ninth, and 
District of Columbia Circuits have reached similar conclusions using this 
interpretation;10 however, the Eleventh Circuit has found corporations liable 
for TVPA violations under the rationale that “individual” means “people”—a 
group that generally includes corporate actors.11 
This Comment examines the dichotomous positions federal courts have 
taken when deciding whether to allow proceedings against a corporation under 
the TVPA.  First, this Comment discusses the legislation and case law that 
gave rise to the TVPA.  Next, this Comment introduces the current circuit split 
and analyzes different courts’ use of statutory language, congressional intent, 
and the significance of the TVPA in conjunction with previous legislation.  
Lastly, this Comment argues that the goals of the TVPA can only be met if 
corporations are held accountable for acts of torture.  Corporate liability under 
the TVPA provides victims with a wider avenue of recovery, heightens 
corporate accountability, and accomplishes the TVPA’s goal of deterring acts 
of killing and torture. 
I.  THE (ANTI) TORTUOUS ROAD: PROHIBITIONS ON TORTURE 
A.  The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Prologue to the TVPA 
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”12  Legislative 
                                                                                                                 
shipped the chemical to Iraq.  Id.  The plaintiffs included “victims, or family members of 
decedent victims, of mustard gas attacks in which the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq used TDG 
supplied by Alcolac.”  Id. at *5. 
 8. Id. at *8–10, 16. 
 9. Id. at *9, 11 (“We hold that the TVPA admits of no ambiguity and Congress’s intent to 
exclude corporations from liability under the TVPA is readily ascertainable from a plain-text 
reading.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13934, at  
*136–37 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2010); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 323–24 (2d. Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. by an equally divided 
court Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008); see also infra Part II.A–B. 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see also Christopher W. Haffke, Comment, The Torture 
Victim Protection Act: More Symbol than Substance, 43 EMORY L.J. 1467, 1472 (1994) (“To fall 
within the jurisdictional requirements of § 1350, three elements must be unequivocally 
established. First, an alien must bring the claim. Second, the claim must be for a tort. Third, the 
claimed tort must either violate a United States treaty or the law of nations.”). 
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history containing direct discussion of the Act’s purpose is scarce;13 however, 
scholars have attempted to ascertain its meaning from accounts of the 
Continental Congress, historical underpinnings of the Constitution and the first 
Judiciary Act, and the founders’ intent.14  Yet, despite the volume of work 
examined in efforts to uncover the Act’s origins, “definitive proof of the 
intended purpose and scope of the [ATCA] is impossible.”15  Nonetheless, the 
statute “was a direct response to what the founders understood to be the 
nation’s duty to propagate and enforce those international law rules that 
directly regulated individual conduct.”16 
                                                 
 13. Haffke, supra note 12, at 1471; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 
(2004) (noting the “poverty of drafting history” for the ATCA, also known as the Alien Torture 
Statute (ATS)); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“This old but little used 
section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary  
Act . . . no one seems to know whence it came.” (citation omitted)), abrogated by Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Jennifer Correale, Comment, The Torture Victim 
Protection Act: A Vital Contribution to International Human Rights Enforcement or Just a Nice 
Gesture?, 6 PACE INT’L L. REV. 197, 203 (1994) (noting that the limited legislative history gives 
“no direct evidence of congressional intent”). 
 14. Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of 
Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 463 (1989); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction 
over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.  
& POL. 1, 11 (1985) (acknowledging the absence of specific history documenting the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, which initially introduced the ATCA, but reasoning that “when pieced together” 
other sources, such as the Constitutional Convention and the drafters’ intentions, “adequately 
indicate the statute’s origins and purposes”).  The Supreme Court has also gleaned the ATCA’s 
purpose in a piecemeal fashion.  According to the Court, the Continental Congress became 
frustrated by its inability to punish violations of the law of nations, and urged states to provide 
relief for such transgressions.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716–17.  The framers, recognizing Congress’s 
powerlessness, provided the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over cases involving 
ambassadors.  Id. at 717; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  Provisions of the Judiciary Act, 
including the ATCA, solidified jurisdiction over aliens.  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 
Stat. 73, 77 (1789); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717. 
 15. Burley, supra note 14, at 463. Professor Anna-Marie Burley criticizes various theories 
intended to elucidate the ATCA.  She argues that the “denial of justice theory,” which posits that 
Congress designed the ATCA to provide aliens with access to federal courts to avoid international 
conflicts, is not supported by the text of the Act.  Id. at 465–69.  Burley also finds the theory that 
the Congress created the ATCA to be an “Ambassador Protection Plan” inadequate, and argues 
that although the drafters of the Constitution and the First Judiciary Act intended to protect 
foreign ambassadors, such a rationale does not fully explain the ATCA’s purpose.  Id. at 469–71. 
 16. Id. at 475 (citation omitted); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES  
*68 (reasoning that transgressions of the law of nations “can rarely be the object of the criminal 
law of any particular state. . . . But where the individuals of any state violate this general law, it is 
then the interest as well as the duty of the government, under which they live, to animadvert upon 
them with a becoming severity that the peace of the world may be maintained”).  Burley notes 
that in a 1781 resolution Congress implored the states to provide redress for violations of the law 
of nations.  Burley, supra note 14, at 476 (citing 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
1774–1789, at 1136–37 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)). 
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1.  Determining the Law of Nations 
The ATCA imposes tort liability for violations of treaties or the law of 
nations.17  The law of nations, commonly referred to as customary international 
law (CIL),18 includes “principles and rules that states feel themselves bound to 
observe, and do commonly observe.”19  According to the Supreme Court, 
sources such as judicial determinations and national customs should be used to 
determine what constitutes binding international law.20  Courts have also 
looked to treaties and conventions between nations to make this 
determination.21 
Although lawsuits for violations of international law provoke questions 
regarding enforcement and jurisdiction,22 the Nuremberg trials “proved that 
international law is real and its norms are binding.”23  The Supreme Court 
affirmed this notion in The Paquete Habana, in which it found the seizure of 
an enemy’s fishing vessel in wartime unlawful.24  The Court stated that such a 
seizure violated a “settled rule of international law,” which was also part of the 
                                                 
 17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  ATCA claims usually arise under the law of nations rather than 
treaties because courts only recognize treaties that are ratified or self-executing to create specific 
causes of action. Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials’ 
Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 71 ALB. L. 
REV. 321 & n.3 (2008).  A self-executing treaty does not require implementing legislation.  See 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (citing Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 
314 (1829), overruled by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833)); Cook v. 
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933). 
 18. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 817 (1997). 
 19. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) 
(citing 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND 
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 1 (2d rev. ed. 1945)). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160–61 (1820) (explaining 
that the law of nations “may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly 
on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions 
recognizing and enforcing that law”). 
 21. See Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 
1999) (identifying the variety of sources from which international law may be derived); see also 
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that provisions included 
in widely ratified and implemented treaties provide evidence of international legal customs). 
 22. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 832. 
 23. Rett R. Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept of 
Constitutional Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 265 (2001); see also Doug 
Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 
NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 307 (2008) (observing that since the Nuremburg trials there has 
been little doubt that international criminal law may be used to hold accomplices liable).  
Furthermore, national courts now recognize international law as imposing civil liability on 
corporations that aid and abet international criminal-law violations.  Id. at 325. 
 24. 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1900). 
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United States’ federal, general common law because “[i]nternational law is 
part of our law.”25  
2.  Reconciling Customary International Law and the Erie Doctrine 
Almost four decades after Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court decided Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins, which rejected the concept of federal general common 
law and held that federal courts could not impose substantive federal common 
law on states when deciding cases under diversity jurisdiction.26  Because the 
Paquete Habana opinion had used the concept of federal common law to 
support its domestic application of CIL,27 some scholars condemned the  
post-Erie application of CIL in federal courts absent implementing 
legislation.28  These attacks on a “non-problem” rely on an inappropriate 
extension of Erie.29  The Erie decision, rooted in state tort law, has no bearing 
on international law.30  Federal courts retain the power to establish federal 
common law for international matters pertaining to foreign relations.31  
Therefore, circuit courts have continued to find CIL applicable as part of 
federal common law post-Erie.32 
                                                 
 25. Id. at 694, 700.  The court added a caveat, noting that international customs must be 
ascertained in the absence of a treaty, statute, or judicial decision.  Id. at 700. 
 26. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  Tompkins sued the New York-based 
railroad company in New York federal court for injuries sustained while walking alongside a 
section of railroad tracks in Pennsylvania.  Id. at 69.  The railroad company argued that under 
Pennsylvania common law, Tompkins was a trespasser and the railroad was only liable for 
injuries resulting from wanton or willful negligence.  Id. at 70.  The Second Circuit affirmed the 
trial court’s decision to hold the railroad liable based on federal general common law.  See 
Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604, 606 (2d Cir. 1937), rev’d, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  The 
Supreme Court reversed, and held that the court should have applied state law, therefore 
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which had authorized federal courts to make 
common law for cases sitting in diversity.  Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80. 
 27. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
 28. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 18, at 853, 870 (“[T]he suggestion that federal courts 
can apply CIL in the absence of any domestic authorization cannot survive  
Erie . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  Critics also question the use of CIL based on principles of 
federalism.  See id. at 862; A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International 
Cases, 20 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 44 (arguing that the doctrine of separation of powers is not violated 
by the application of CIL). 
 29. See Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1827–28 (1998) (attacking Professor Curtis Bradley and Professor Jack 
Goldsmith’s thesis).  Then-Professor Harold Koh argues that the Erie decision was not intended 
to discharge “federal courts from their traditional role in construing customary international law 
norms” and that Bradley and Goldsmith are “utterly mistaken” in their position.  Id. at 1821, 
1831. 
 30. See id. at 1831. 
 31. Id. at 1831–35. 
 32. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 499, 
502 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700) (noting that acts of torture are 
actionable under the ATCA as violations of customary international law). 
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Courts need not necessarily address the issue of CIL applicability when 
adjudicating lawsuits involving alleged ATCA and TVPA violations because 
both acts specifically allow lawsuits for violations of certain international-law 
customs.33  However, under the ATCA, courts must still ascertain what 
constitutes a violation of the law of nations.  
3.  Revival of the Alien Tort Claims Act 
In the 170 years following the enactment of the ACTA, in only one instance 
did a court find jurisdiction under the Act to hear a case.34  As a result, courts 
did not have the opportunity to decide which actions violated the law of 
nations until the late twentieth century.35  Courts’ hesitancy to entertain ATCA 
lawsuits stemmed from concerns about possible foreign-relations 
repercussions36 because, as the name of the Act indicates, only aliens could 
bring suit under the ATCA.37  
a.  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Broad Interpretation of the ATCA 
When the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980,38 claims 
for alleged human-rights violations arose with greater frequency.39  In 
Filartiga, family members of Joelito Filartiga brought a wrongful-death suit 
against Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, the former inspector general of police in 
                                                 
 33. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); 
see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004) (noting the TVPA provides “a clear 
mandate” for claims of torture and extrajudicial killing); Charles W. Brower II, Calling All 
NGOs: A Discussion of the Continuing Vitality of the Alien Tort Statute as a Tool in the Fight for 
International Human Rights in the Wake of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 929, 
941–42 (2005) (“[T]he statutory text of the [ATCA], while primarily a jurisdictional grant, 
provides a legitimate grant of authority for the federal courts to determine substantive causes of 
action in the narrow field of ‘violations of the law of nations.’” (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723)). 
 34. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 254 (2d Cir. 
2009) (citing Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712). 
 35. See also Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 650 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (noting that in 
the two centuries following the enactment of the ATCA, the Act was “rarely [utilized] before 
being ‘discovered’ around 1980 and increasingly relied upon in the last few decades”). 
 36. See Correale, supra note 13, at 207 (“ATCA actions may implicate matters of foreign 
relations, meaning matters which are exclusively within the constitutional domain of the 
legislative and executive branches of government.” (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 
726 F.2d 774, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). 
 37. Id. at 198 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
 38. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 39. See Haffke, supra note 12, at 1472 (“It was not until the landmark decision Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala that a court was willing to find the requisite international legal violation, thereby 
exercising its jurisdiction extraterritorially.”); see also Joel H. Samuels, How Piracy Has Shaped 
the Relationship Between American Law and International Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1250 
(2010) (calling Filartiga “[t]he case that revived the ATS as a mechanism to prosecute human 
rights violations”). 
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Asuncion, Paraguay.40  The family alleged that Pena-Irala had kidnapped 
seventeen-year-old Filartiga and tortured him to death in retaliation for the 
political leanings of his father.41  Filartiga’s sister said she was taken to see her 
brother’s tortured body at Pena-Irala’s home, where the defendant told her, 
“[h]ere you have . . . what you deserve.”42    
The Filartigas brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York, which subsequently dismissed the complaint for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction.43  Reversing this dismissal, the Second Circuit held 
that torture violates the law of nations and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction 
to hear Filartiga’s claim under the ATCA.44  The court noted that the 
“universal condemnation of torture” exhibited by international customs and 
treaties justified its recognition as a punishable transgression under the law of 
nations.45  The court also reasoned that globally, citizens expected 
governments to uphold their basic human rights.46 
                                                 
 40. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 41. Id.  The victim’s father, Joel Filartiga, opposed then-President Alfredo Stroessner. Id.  
During Stroessner’s thirty-five-year presidency, Paraguay experienced an “uninterrupted period 
of repression” and “became a haven for Nazi war criminals, deposed dictators and smugglers.”  
Adam Bernstein, Alfredo Stroessner: Paraguayan Dictator, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2006, at B5.  
Individuals who protested under President Stroessner’s dictatorship were tortured. Id.  Carlos 
Levi Rufinelli, leader of an opposing party, claims he was tortured six times during President 
Stroessner’s rule.  Diana Jean Schemo, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, Ruled Paraguay Through Fear 
for 35 Years, Dies in Exile at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at B7.  He told the New York Times 
that “[m]ost of the time, I did not know what they wanted . . . [b]ut when they put the needles 
under your fingernails, you tell them anything.  You denounce everybody . . . .” Id. 
 42. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.  Filartiga’s father attempted to pursue criminal action against 
Pena-Irala in Paraguay, resulting only in the arrest of Filartiga’s attorney and a suspicious 
confession from a man who lived with Pena-Irala.  Id.  Hugo Duarte confessed to killing Filartiga 
in a crime of passion after finding the deceased with his wife; however, he was never convicted.  
Id.  The Filartigas, however, argued that Joelito’s body showed wounds consistent with torture.  
Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (“[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates 
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality 
of the parties.”).  The court noted that the district judge “felt constrained” by prior circuit 
decisions, which favored a narrow construction of the “law of nations”; therefore, the judge 
dismissed the matter despite strong indications that torture violates customary international law.  
Id. at 880. 
 45. Id.; see, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 55–56 (requiring members to “pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action” to achieve equal rights, including a “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”). 
 46. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (indicating that more than fifty-five countries had 
constitutions prohibiting torture). 
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b.  Torture: A Cause of Action Under the ATCA? 
Although the number of ATCA actions increased after Filartiga, the court’s 
decision to include torture as an actionable violation of the law of nations 
under the ATCA sparked disagreement.47  In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab 
Republic, Israeli citizens sued various defendants, including the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), for injuries and deaths caused by the PLO’s 
seizure of a civilian bus in Israel.48  The plaintiffs alleged that the PLO’s 
crimes violated the law of nations and asserted jurisdiction under the ATCA, 
among other statutes.49  Although the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal of the action in a per curiam decision, the judges each 
filed a separate concurring opinion outlining their different rationales.50  
Judge T. Harry Edwards argued that despite the momentum in international 
law “toward a more expansive allocation of rights and obligations to entities 
other than states,” torture should not be a recognizable cause of action against 
non-state actors under the ATCA.51  Emphasizing the “extremely narrow 
scope” of ATCA jurisdiction under Filartiga, he argued that the PLO’s acts of 
torture did not give rise to federal jurisdiction because the organization did 
                                                 
 47. See id. at 878.  The ATCA is primarily considered a jurisdiction-granting statute; 
however, courts recognize that violations of the laws of nations are actionable under the ATCA.  
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (recognizing that although the ATCA is 
jurisdictional in nature, the ATCA allows actions “for [a] modest number of international law 
violations” as determined by “norm[s] of international character accepted by the civilized world); 
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting the ATCA allows 
claims for violations of the law of nations but that it does not supply an independent cause of 
action); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(reasoning that relief under the ATCA requires international-law violations) (citation omitted). 
 48. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).  According to the plaintiffs, thirteen 
PLO terrorists seized the bus while on a “barbaric rampage” of a main highway in Israel.  Id. at 
776 (Edwards, J., concurring).  Taking passengers hostage from various automobiles, the PLO 
terrorists injured, tortured, and murdered them.  Id.  The attack resulted in thirty-four deaths, 
including twelve children, and eighty-seven injuries.  Id.  In addition to the PLO, the plaintiffs’ 
lawsuit also named as defendants the Libyan Arab Republic, (alleging that it trained and financed 
the terrorist attack), the Palestine Information Office (as an agent of the PLO), and the National 
Association of Arab Americans (alleging they helped finance and plan the attack, along with the 
PLO).  Id. at 799–800 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. at 775 (per curiam).  The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under four federal statutes 
for “multiple tortious acts in violation of the law of nations, treaties of the United States, and 
criminal laws of the United States, as well as the common law.”  Id.  In addition to ATCA 
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs claimed diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal-question 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611.  Id. 
 50. Id.  Acknowledging the lack of clarity surrounding the ACTA and variation among the 
judges’ legal rationales, Judge Robert Bork commented that “it is impossible to say even what the 
law of this circuit is. Though we agree on nothing else, I am sure my colleagues join me in 
finding that regrettable.”  Id. at 823 (Bork, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
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“not act under color of any recognized state’s law.”52  Nonetheless, Judge 
Edwards acknowledged that violations committed by official state actors in 
contravention of the law of nations could give rise to ATCA claims.53 
Judge Robert Bork disagreed with this assessment, and declined to recognize 
any cause of action under the ATCA.54  He stated that the ATCA only confers 
jurisdiction, and rejected the Second Circuit’s approach in Filartiga because it 
undermined the established limitations on jurisdiction in federal court.55  
Instead, Judge Bork’s interpretation would have required the creation of an 
explicit cause of action to hear ATCA           claims—something that could be 
effectuated through a self-executing treaty.56 
c.  The Supreme Court Approves Filartiga and Narrows the Use of the 
ATCA 
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court favorably relied on 
Filartiga, but it ultimately limited application of the ATCA.57  Alvarez-
Machain, a Mexican physician, sued for false arrest and violation of the law of 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 781, 791.  Judge Edwards noted that the PLO had never been a recognized state or 
actor thereof, which distinguished the terrorist group from the official in Filartiga who, under 
color of state law, allegedly committed torture.  Id. at 791.  Because the PLO’s lack of state 
affiliation prevented it from committing “official torture,” it could not be held liable under the 
ATCA.  Id.  In Judge Edwards’s opinion, expanding Filartiga to include unofficial torture “would 
require this court to venture out of the comfortable realm of established international law—within 
which Filartiga firmly sat—in which states are the actors.”  Id. at 792.  Judge Bork’s concurrence 
noted the “general rule that international law imposes duties only on states and on their agents or 
officials,” and stated that subjecting the PLO to liability “would establish a new principle of 
international law.”  Id. at 805–06 (Bork, J., concurring); see also Justin Lu, Note, Jurisdiction 
over Non-State Activity Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 531, 537 
(1997) (noting the agreement between the concurrences of Judge Edward and Bork on the 
ATCA’s state-action requirement). 
 53. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 792–93 (Edwards, J., concurring).  Judge Edwards also rejected 
terrorism as an actionable ATCA violation.  Id. at 795.  By examining current international 
standards, he determined that countries were too divided on the “legitimacy of such aggression” 
to consider terrorist attacks violations of the law of nations.  Id.  He argued that terrorism, 
although repugnant, does not necessarily constitute a violation of the law of nations.  Id. at 796. 
 54. Id. at 811 (Bork, J., concurring) (reasoning the ATCA does not provide an express or 
implied cause of action because it simply provides jurisdiction over a class of cases). 
 55. Id. at 811–12.  Judge Bork called the appellant’s construction of the ATCA “too 
sweeping” because it would “authorize tort suits for the vindication of any international legal 
right” and conflict with limits on federal-court jurisdiction.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 816.  Under Judge Bork’s construction, the ATCA’s “current function would be 
quite modest unless a modern statute, treaty, or executive agreement provided a private cause of 
action for violations of new international norms.”  Id.; see also Anthony D’Amato, What Does 
Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork’s Concept of the Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 
AM. J. INT’L L. 92, 97 (1985) (“[U]nder Judge Bork’s view, most of the rules of international law 
are similar to a non-self-executing treaty; they have no impact upon individuals.”).  In a third 
concurring opinion, Judge Roger Robb affirmed dismissal of the case based on the political-
question doctrine.  Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). 
 57. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725–44  (2004). 
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nations under the ATCA.58  DEA officials suspected that Alvarez-Machain had 
intentionally prolonged the life of a DEA agent captured in Mexico to extend 
his torture.59  After the Mexican government refused to assist in Alvarez-
Machain’s arrest, the DEA secured help from a group of Mexican nationals, 
including petitioner Jose Francisco Sosa.60  This group seized Alvarez-
Machain from his home in Mexico, detained him overnight in a motel, and 
then flew him to Texas where federal officers arrested him.61  
Although the Supreme Court in Sosa agreed that district courts could 
entertain private causes of action for violations of the law of nations,62 the 
Court rejected Alvarez-Machain’s claim and limited the reach of the ATCA.63  
It noted that courts should only recognize claims for violations of international 
legal customs that are as definite as those accepted at the time of the ATCA’s 
enactment.64  Alvarez-Machain’s claim did not fit within this paradigm.65  The 
Court reasoned that Congress intended the Act to invoke jurisdiction for a 
“relatively modest set of actions,” and cautioned courts against expanding the 
ATCA to include new causes of action.66  
                                                 
 58. Id. at 698.  The claim for false arrest was raised under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b)(1), which abrogates federal sovereign immunity for certain personal injury suits caused 
by the government.  Id.  Alvarez-Machain was arrested (and later acquitted) for the torture and 
murder of a DEA agent working in Mexico.  Id. at 697–98. 
 59. Id. at 697.  DEA agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar was captured in Mexico in 1985, 
where he was tortured and interrogated for two days in Guadalajara before he was killed.  Id. 
 60. Id. at 698. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 712, 729. 
 63. Id. at 724–25, 732. 
 64. Id. at 732 (“[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims 
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content 
and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was 
enacted.”).  Such offenses include “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”  Id. at 724.  Under this formulation, the court noted that Filartiga 
properly allowed jurisdiction under the ACA because the Second Circuit had likened torture to 
piracy.  Id. at 732; see also Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over 
Application of the Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of Fundamental Human Rights by 
Corporations, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 563, 566 (2003) (“The ATCA applies only to violations of the 
law of nations, which the federal courts have interpreted narrowly to cover only genocide, war 
crimes, extrajudicial killing, slavery, torture, unlawful detention, and crimes against humanity.”). 
 65. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733, 738. 
 66. Id. at 720, 728 (“We have no congressional mandate to seek out and define new and 
debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congressional understanding 
of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity.”); see 
also Erin Talati, Comment, An Open Door to Ending Exploitation: Accountability for Violations 
of Informed Consent Under the Alien Tort Statute, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 231, 252–53 (2006) (noting 
that although Sosa did not expressly limit ATCA violations to those existing in 1789, the only 
acts that would be recognized were those that reached “the degree of international concern” that 
existed at the time of the founding). 
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In the Supreme Court’s view, a potential cause of action under the ATCA 
should be analyzed according to current constructions and ideals of 
international law (rather than only those in existence when the law was 
passed), and such norms must be accepted with the same veracity as those 
recognized in 1789.67  Therefore, the Second Circuit in Filartiga appropriately 
likened torture to piracy—a violation recognized during the ATCA’s 
enactment—by assessing the constitutions, agreements, and conventions 
between nations that existed at the time of the decision.68  As norms under 
international law continue to evolve, this test requires courts to continually 
reassess what constitutes the law of nations, rather than relying on examples 
from previously adjudicated violations.69 
4.  Corporate Liability Under the ATCA 
a.  The Unocal Decision 
Plaintiffs who rely on a theory of human-rights violations and successfully 
prove that their suit involves a violation of the law of nations may attack 
corporate actors if the opportunity arises.70  Such actions gained strong 
precedent beginning in the 1990s, when ATCA claims against corporations 
sharply increased.71  Previously, ATCA claims typically had targeted state 
                                                 
 67. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(noting that at the time of the decision, torture was prohibited by the constitutions of many 
nations). 
 68. See supra notes 44–46, 64 and accompanying text. 
 69. See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. Regarding the exercise of judicial power 
over international norms, Sosa expressed that “the door is still ajar subject to vigilant 
doorkeeping.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729; see also Nelson P. Miller, Steven W. Fitschen & William 
Wagner, Federal Courts Enforcing Customary International Law: The Salutary Effect of Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain on the Institutional Legitimacy of the Judiciary, 3 REGENT J. INT’L L. 1, 3 
(2005) (observing that the Sosa opinion narrows the scope of what may constitute a cause of 
action under CIL). 
 70. See Christine G. Rolph & Mark A. Miller, Client Alert: The Steady Rise of Alien Tort 
Claims Act Lawsuits and the Effects on US Companies, LATHAM & WATKINS (Sept. 7, 2010), 
http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent_pdf/pub3703_1.pdf. 
 71. See Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to 
Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 6–7 (2004); 
see also Rolph & Miller, supra note 70, at 2 (noting that ATCA lawsuits originally arose based on 
state action, but the “landscape changed in the late 1990s when US companies began to feel the 
brunt of the ATCA”).  Concern over the role of corporations in human-rights abuses “emerged in 
the 1990s as news stories depicting the opportunistic use of child labor, payment of low wages, 
and abuses in foreign factories helped reshape our attitudes about acceptable behavior for 
organizations.”  O.C. FERRELL, JOHN FRAEDRICH & LINDA FERRELL, BUSINESS ETHICS: 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING AND CASES 277 (7th ed. 2008); see also Nicky Black, Business 
Action on Human Rights—Doing No Harm, Good Works, and Good Business in the Developing 
World, in CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: NEW PARTNERSHIP 
PERSPECTIVES 57, 61 (Esben Rahbek Pedersen & Mahad Huniche eds., 2006) (“The 1990s saw 
an explosion of human rights activism aimed at the private sector . . . .”); About Our Program, 
HUM. RTS. FIRST, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/our-work/business-and-human-rights/about-
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actors and agents,72 but Doe v. Unocal Corp. recognized a shift from state 
agents to corporations as recognized defendants.73  In Doe, Burmese plaintiffs 
alleged that defendant Unocal, a California-based oil company, had used the 
Burmese military to enslave farmers, seize their land, and violently force entire 
villages to relocate to lay a pipeline.74  The United States District Court for the 
Central District of California denied Unocal’s motion to dismiss.75  
Determining that it had proper subject-matter jurisdiction, the court allowed 
                                                                                                                 
our-program/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (explaining that the organization began to “explore the 
intersections between business and human rights in the mid-1990s”).  Accordingly, the number of 
corporate defendants involved in ATCA lawsuits increased “with allegations that the foreign 
government, insurgents or other individuals inflicting the harm actually were agents of (or in a 
conspiracy with) the corporate defendants.”  J. Russell Jackson, Alien Tort Claims Act Cases 
Keep Coming, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 14, 2009, at 32. Additionally, the expansion of jurisdiction under 
the ATCA allowed new causes of action to be brought against corporations, further augmenting 
the number of ATCA lawsuits.  Id. 
 72. See Duruigbo, supra note 71, at 6–7.  Although international law is “States-centric,” 
Professor Emeka Duruigbo recognizes that the “dominance of the State has been whittled down 
and non-state actors . . . have been accepted as subjects of international law.”  Id. at 37.  He also 
notes that the broadening scope of the proper subjects of international law “has not reached 
multinational corporations,” but he acknowledges that there is a “growing clamor for a change in 
this area” as a result of the increasing global influence of multinational corporations.  Id. at 37–
38. 
 73. Id. at 6–7; see Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 74. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 883.  Along with Unocal and several of its executives, the plaintiffs 
named as defendants the French corporation, Total S.A., Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise 
(MOGE), and State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).  Id.  The court found that 
MOGE and SLORC were immune from the suit based on the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act.  
Id. at 888.  The lawsuit focused on Unocal’s pipeline project in a natural gas field in Burma, 
called the Yadana Field.  Manuel Velasquez, UNOCAL in Burma, SANTA CLARA UNIV. (Nov. 3, 
2005), http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/business/Unocal-in-Burma.html.  The 
plaintiff, EarthRights International, sued on behalf of the victims and called the Yadana Pipeline 
Project “one of the world’s most controversial natural gas development projects” because of the 
human-rights violations allegedly committed by the companies involved—including “forced 
labor, land confiscation, rape, torture, [and] murder.”  The Yadana Pipeline, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, 
http://www.earthrights.org/campaigns/yadana-pipeline (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also What 
We Do, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L, http://www.earthrights.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) 
(highlighting Earth Right’s representation of the Unocal plaintiffs).  Various human-rights groups 
met with Unocal to discuss these alleged abuses, and a consultant for the company reported that 
“egregious human rights violations” were occurring; however, the Yadana Pipeline Project 
continued.  Velasquez, supra.  In a letter to the New York Times, Roger C. Beach, Chairman and 
Chief Executive of Unocal, defended the project as generating jobs and other opportunities for 
poor residents of Burma (now Myanmar).  Roger C. Beach, Letter to the Editor, Isolating 
Myanmar Would Only Cause Hardship for Its People, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996, at A28 (stating 
that the company and its affiliates “adhered to strict standards on employment practices” and 
denying the use of forced labor). 
 75. Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884. 
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plaintiffs to pursue their ATCA claim against the company.76  After the Ninth 
Circuit’s order for rehearing, Unocal settled with the plaintiffs in 2005.77   
b.  ATCA Lawsuits Against Corporations 
After the Unocal decision, “[ATCA] jurisprudence has been dominated by 
cases alleging human rights . . . abuses by multinational corporations.”78  As 
businesses became subject to ATCA lawsuits, they attempted to challenge the 
Act; however, they were largely unsuccessful because prior case law clearly 
permitted ATCA claims for violations of the law of nations.79  For example, in 
Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., the Fifth Circuit entertained a suit 
by a citizen of Great Britain against a Texas-based corporation for torture and 
imprisonment.80  In Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., the plaintiffs alleged that 
the corporate defendants aided and abetted in the murder and torture of union 
leaders.81  Relying on prior case law, the Eleventh Circuit rejected defendant 
Coca-Cola’s argument that corporate defendants could not be liable under the 
ATCA.82  Similarly, the Second Circuit willingly reviewed a suit by Sudanese 
plaintiffs against a Canadian corporation for alleged human rights violations in 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.; ultimately, however, 
the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant corporation.83 
c.  The Second Circuit Questions Corporate Liability 
Despite such precedent, the Second Circuit held in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. that the ATCA does not provide jurisdiction over corporations 
for violations of the law of nations.84  In Kiobel, Nigerian plaintiffs brought 
suit under the ATCA, and alleged that three oil companies aided and abetted 
                                                 
 76. Id.  In 2003, the Ninth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc, vacating the previous 
decision of that circuit.  Doe, 395 F.3d at 978–79. In its order, the Ninth Circuit stated that the 
2002 decision could not be cited as precedent.  Id. 
 77. Liesbeth F.H. Enneking, Crossing the Atlantic? The Political and Legal Feasibility of 
European Foreign Direct Liability Cases, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 903, 903 n.3 (2009). 
 78. Duruigbo, supra note 71, at 7 (noting Unocal “opened the floodgates in this arena” by 
allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over a multinational corporation for human rights 
violations). 
 79. Collingsworth, supra note 64, at 565 (noting that ATCA case law was “well reasoned, 
strongly supported by precedent, and nearly unanimous in holding that the ATCA does allow 
claims for violations of the law of nations”). 
 80. 835 F.2d 109, 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff failed to show a causal 
connection between his imprisonment and torture and the corporation’s actions). 
 81. 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 82. Id. at 1263 (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008)); 
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 83. 582 F.3d 244, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2009).  According to plaintiffs, the defendant energy 
company aided and abetted and conspired with the government to commit genocide, torture, and 
war crimes during its oil exploration in Southern Sudan.  Id. at 251. 
 84. 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, 80 U.S.L.W. 3019 (U.S. Jun. 6, 
2011) (No. 10-1491). 
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the Nigerian government in brutally attacking and arresting Ogoni residents, as 
well as causing property destruction.85  The Second Circuit dismissed the claim 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and justified its departure from 
Presbyterian Church by pointing out that the court in that case had simply 
presumed permissibility of corporate liability under the ATCA, but had not 
specifically ruled on the issue.86  
In Kiobel, the court distinguished between corporate obligations under 
domestic and international law, and argued that although corporations are often 
considered “persons” subject to liability in the United States, this national 
determination was “entirely irrelevant” to determining corporate liability under 
international-law customs.87  According to the Second Circuit, courts have 
found liability of natural persons for violations of international law 
permissible, whereas corporate liability has consistently been rejected.88  
i.  Early Reactions to Kiobel 
In his concurrence, Judge Pierre Leval adamantly rejected the majority’s 
finding that international law does not apply to corporations.89  He argued that 
the majority’s opinion serves to protect those who violate human rights if they 
“simply . . . tak[e] the precaution of conducting the heinous operation in the 
corporate form.”90  Agreeing with Judge Leval’s concurrence, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected Kiobel’s 
holding in Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, and held 
that an international banking institution could be liable for genocide under the 
                                                 
 85. Id. at 123.  (“Specifically, plaintiffs brought claims of aiding and abetting (1) 
extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and 
association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”).  The Nigerian residents brought suit 
against three corporate defendants: Netherland-based Royal Dutch Petroleum, British Shell 
Transport and Trading Company, and a Nigerian-based subsidiary of Shell.  Id.  In their opening 
brief, the plaintiffs stated that Shell’s oil production violated elementary environmental practices, 
which resulted in “catastrophic effects” in the Ogoni region and ignited local protests.  Opening 
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d. Cir. 2010) 
(No. 06-4800).  Plaintiff Dr. Barinem Kiobel, an executive council member for a political 
subdivision of Nigeria, allegedly opposed the council’s plan to use violence against the protestors 
to guarantee Shell’s oil extraction in the region.  Id. at 6–7.  The plaintiffs allege that Kiobel was 
arrested and tortured while a task force designed to “restore order” in Ogoni raided the area, 
“[breaking] into homes, shooting or beating anyone . . . raping . . . forcing villagers to flee and 
abandon their homes, and burning, destroying or looting property.”  Id. at 9–10. 
 86. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124–25. 
 87. Id. at 117 n.11. 
 88. Id. at 119.  But see Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A 
New Approach, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1931, 1961–62 (2010) (“Although corporate liability is 
frequently rejected in international criminal law because many domestic legal systems do not 
impose criminal liability on corporations, this reasoning does not apply in the civil context.”). 
 89. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 150 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 90. Id. 
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ATCA.91  The court looked to “persuasive precedent” and international 
humanitarian goals to determine that it had jurisdiction over the Hungarian 
Jews’ suit against the bank for allegedly withholding funds from Holocaust 
victims.92  
ii.  The D.C. and Seventh Circuits Decline to Follow the Second Circuit 
In July 2011, the D.C. and Seventh Circuits rejected the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Kiobel.93  In Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., the Seventh 
Circuit stated that “[t]he factual premise of the majority opinion in the Kiobel 
case is incorrect,” as corporations have been held liable in the past for violating 
the law of nations.94  The court also mused that even if corporations had not 
previously faced liability, the court could still enforce international norms by 
finding corporate liability.95  In holding that the ATCA applies to corporations 
in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the D.C. Circuit similarly found that the Second 
Circuit improperly focused on whether the law of nations allows individuals to 
sue corporate actors.96  The D.C. Circuit viewed the legal issue as one of 
agency law, and found that corporations can be liable for damages under the 
ATCA when its agents violate international customary laws.97  
Although the Seventh and D.C. Circuits rejected Kiobel because they viewed 
it as an “outlier” case that mischaracterized the law,98 the Second Circuit’s 
decision may ultimately prompt more courts—and eventually the Supreme 
Court—to decide whether corporations are liable under the ATCA.99  The 
decision will likely continue to cause other circuits to reevaluate the 
presumption that corporate liability is permissible under the ATCA.100  
                                                 
 91. Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, No. 10 C 1884, 2011 WL 
1900340, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *84 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 
2011). 
 94. 643 F.3d at 1017 (discussing the dissolution of German companies that assisted the Nazi 
Government) (citations omitted). 
 95. Id. (“There is always a first time for litigation to enforce a norm; there has to be. There 
were no multinational prosecutions for aggression and crimes against humanity before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal was created.”). 
 96. 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *84–85. 
 97. Id. at *85 (“[C]orporate liability is consistent with the purpose of the [ATCA].”). 
 98. See Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017; Doe, 2011 U.S. App., at *84. 
 99. Gwendolyn Wilber Jaramillo, Second Circuit Holds That Corporations are Not Proper 
Defendants Under the Alien Tort Statute, CORP. SOC. RESP. & L. (Sept. 19, 2010), 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2010/09/articles/litigation/alien-tort-statute/second-circuit-holds-
that-corporations-are-not-proper-defendants-under-the-alien-tort-statute/ (calling the Kiobel 
decision “one of the most significant [ATCA] decision[s] in years,” but noting that the decision 
does not mark the end of ATCA lawsuits against corporations). 
 100. See John B. Bellinger III, Will Federal Court’s Kiobel Ruling End Second Wave of 
Alien Tort Statute Suits?, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Nov. 12, 2010), http://www.wlf.org 
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B.  Codification of the Filartiga Decision: Enactment of the Torture Victim 
Protection Act 
Concerned in part by Judge Bork’s concurrence in Tel-Oren, Congress 
enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act in 1992, which essentially codified 
the Filartiga decision.101  The TVPA states:  
An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of 
law, of any foreign nation— 
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, 
be liable for damages to that individual; or 
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a 
civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal 
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in 
an action for wrongful death.102  
This act provides clear actionable wrongs (torture and extrajudicial killings) 
and remedies—elements absent from the ATCA.103 
1.  Explicit Definitions: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings 
Unlike the ATCA, the TVPA defines torture and extrajudicial killings, thus 
providing clear guidelines for courts to determine if a violation of the Act has 
occurred.104  The TVPA specifies that the extrajudicial killing must be 
unauthorized and deliberate.105  The statute’s lengthy description of torture 
                                                                                                                 
/publishing/publication_detail.asp?id=2213 (speculating that in the event of an appeal to the 
Supreme Court and a grant of certiorari, Kiobel will likely be upheld); Konrad L. Cailteux & 
Jeremy T. Grabill, Foreign Tort Suits Under 221 Year-Old Law Ruled Out Against Corporations, 
WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2010/09/20/foreign-tort-suits-
under-221-year-old-law-ruled-out-against-business-defendants/ (discussing the unavoidable 
impact of the Kiobel decision on ATCA jurisprudence). 
 101. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (“Judge 
Bork questioned the existence of a private right of action under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
reasoning that separation of powers principles required an explicit . . . grant by Congress . . . . The 
TVPA would provide such a grant, and would also enhance the remedy already available under 
[the ATCA] . . . .”); see also Tracy Bishop Holton, Cause of Action to Recover Civil Damages 
Pursuant to the Law of Nations and/or Customary International Law, in 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 
(SECOND) 327, 347 (2003) (“The TVPA was inspired by a plurality decision rendered by a 
divided panel of the D.C. Circuit in [Tel-Oren], particularly the concurring opinion of Judge 
Robert Bork, which deftly asserted that the [ATCA] provided jurisdiction only and not a cause of 
action.” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4)). 
 102. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
 103. Id. § 3. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 3(a).  The TVPA defines “extrajudicial killing” as “deliberated killing not 
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. . . . [but not] such 
killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign 
nation.” Id. 
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includes mental and physical suffering caused by intentionally inflicted pain, 
threats of death, actual or threatened application of substances designed to 
distort the senses, or threats that a third party will be subject to such 
treatment.106 
2.  “Color of Law”: The State-Actor Requirement 
To incur liability under the TVPA, individuals must have acted under “color 
of law.”107  This stipulation essentially allows courts to impose liability on 
private actors if their allegedly wrongful act would otherwise be deemed a 
state action,108 such as when private individuals act in conjunction with or are 
aided by state officials.109  Plaintiffs must prove that the alleged torture or 
extrajudicial killing involved a “symbiotic relationship between a private actor 
and the government.”110  Courts have interpreted this to permit liability only 
                                                 
 106. Id.  § 3(b). The TVPA defines “torture” as: 
[A]ny act, directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical control, 
by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or 
inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that 
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that individual for 
an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind; and 
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting 
from— 
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical 
pain or suffering; 
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
    (C) the threat of imminent death; or 
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to 
death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or 
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated 
to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality. 
Id. 
 107. Id. § 2(a). 
 108. See Samuel L. David, A Foul Immigration Policy: U.S. Misinterpretation of the Non-
Refoulement Obligation Under the Convention Against Torture, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 
769, 801 (2003) (noting that the “Supreme Court has established that the phrase ‘under color of 
law’ is essentially synonymous with the ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” and explaining that a private party may be considered a public actor if the private 
party “performs what would otherwise be a government function”). 
 109. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 110. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
plaintiffs failed to meet the state-action requirement because they did not offer evidence of state 
involvement in the alleged assassination and torture of union leaders).  The Supreme Court 
utilizes various tests when determining whether state action is present.  See Estate of Rodriquez v. 
Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1265 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“The United States Supreme 
Court has articulated four alternative tests for the state action question: (1) the public function 
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when an actor has (1) “specific knowledge and intent to assist in the violation,” 
(2) actually assists in the violation, and (3) recognizes his or her role in 
perpetrating the unlawful act.111 
In Romero v. Drummond Co., the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s TVPA claim for failure to show a 
“symbiotic relationship” between the corporate defendant and the Columbian 
government.112  The plaintiffs—representatives and affiliates of a trade 
union—brought suit against the company for allegedly paying paramilitary 
agents to torture and kill union leaders.113  However, the plaintiffs’ evidence 
only established a “general relationship” between the paramilitary operatives 
and the Columbian government, and thus failed to meet the state-actor 
requirement.114  As Romero demonstrates, the Eleventh Circuit requires 
plaintiffs pursuing a TVPA claim not only to allege facts that show torture or 
extrajudicial killing, but also to show a close nexus between such torture and a 
clear sanction by the state.115 
3.  Effect of the Legislation on the ATCA 
Early versions of the TVPA introduced before the House and Senate during 
the mid-1980s revealed that the purpose of the Act was to provide a civil cause 
of action for both alien and domestic torture victims, including those residing 
                                                                                                                 
test; (2) the symbiotic relationship test; (3) the nexus test; and (4) the joint action test.”).  Under 
the public-function test, state action may exist when a private entity exercises “powers 
traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”  Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 
352–53 (1974).  Similarly, the Supreme Court has found state action to exist under the symbiotic-
relationship test when a privately operated restaurant was financed by public funds and owned by 
an agent of the state.  Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–24 (1961) (using 
the symbiotic-relationship test to find that the restaurant had violated the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—an amendment only applicable to state action—by denying 
service to an African American).  Under the “sufficiently close nexus” test, courts examine the 
connections that exist between the private action and the government.  Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 
(dismissing an action against a corporation for wrongfully terminating electrical services and 
holding that Pennsylvania did not have sufficient connections to the corporation’s actions for the 
customer to hold the state liable under the Fourteenth Amendment).  Lastly, under the joint-action 
test, state action may arise from “a willful participant [who acts] in joint action with the State or 
its agents.”  Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). 
 111. Rosaleen T. O’Gara, Note, Procedural Dismissals Under the Alien Tort Statute, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 797, 807 (2010) (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 
453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 112. 552 F.3d 1303, 1317 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 113. Id. at 1309. 
 114. Id. at 1317 (noting that to prove state action, “[t]he relationship must involve the subject 
of the complaint”).  The court excluded the plaintiff’s key declarations as inadmissible hearsay, 
and refused to allow the plaintiffs to introduce testimony from a former member of the 
Colombian Army because it was discovered after the district court’s decision.   Id. at 1317–18.  
Considering all the admissible evidence, the court found an insufficient basis to demonstrate the 
government’s involvement. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1317. 
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in the United States—a category of persons formerly excluded by the 
ATCA.116  Proponents of the TVPA expected the Act “to reinforce, to support, 
and to strengthen” the ATCA by expanding its scope and extending redress to 
U.S. citizens.117  Moreover, proponents hoped that express language of the 
TVPA would complement the ATCA and eliminate concerns among those 
judges who questioned whether human-rights violations constituted recognized 
claims under the ATCA.118 
The TVPA did not repeal or replace the ATCA in any way; therefore, 
plaintiffs may still bring actions alleging a violation of the law of nations under 
both the ATCA and the TVPA.119  In fact, Congress indicated that the ATCA 
continued to have important functions following the TVPA’s enactment, which 
demonstrates that Congress intended the TVPA to expand and clarify the 
earlier statute.120  
                                                 
 116. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 2–3 (1991) (noting that the legislation, which was first 
introduced in 1986, was intended to protect “any” individual subjected to torture or extrajudicial 
killing under color of law); see also The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup 
Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs and its Subcomm. on Human Rights & Int’l Orgs. of the 
H.R. on H.R. 1417, 100th Cong. 1 (1988) [hereinafter TVPA Hearing and Markup] (statement of 
Rep. Gus Yatron) (noting that Congressman Yatron, Chairman, Subcomm. on Human Rights and 
International Organizations, introduced the TVPA along with two other congressmen during the 
99th Congress).  This hearing introduced a bill that was “virtually identical” to the version of the 
TVPA eventually enacted in 1991.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 5–6 (1991), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88.  A version of the bill was also introduced in the 101st Congress before 
passage in the 102nd Congress.  See id.  During the subcommittee hearing, Michael H. Posner, 
executive director for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, noted that the Act clarifies the 
ATCA by expressly providing relief to U.S. citizens.  See TVPA Hearing and Markup, supra, at 
19 (statement of Michael H. Posner). 
 117. TVPA Hearing and Markup, supra note 116, at 19. 
 118. Id. at 8 (statement of Father Robert Drinan on behalf of the American Bar Association). 
 119. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d 
197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing to repeal the ATCA by implication and noting that the 
TVPA provides no clear intent to invalidate the ATCA, nor are the two statutes inconsistent with 
each other); see also United States v. United Cont’l Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 168 (1976) (“It is, 
of course, a cardinal principle of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not 
favored.”); cf. Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (stating that an act may be 
repealed by implication only if the two statutes “irreconciabl[y] conflict” or the later act is 
“clearly intended as a substitute”). 
 120. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991); Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 380 (“Considering that 
the TVPA ‘enhances’ rather than shrinks the scope of remedies under [the ATCA], there is no 
reason to conclude that by enacting the TVPA Congress took away causes of action for torture 
and extrajudicial killings under [the ATCA].”); see also Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 888 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“The two acts . . . are not competing provisions but are meant to be 
complementary and mutually reinforcing (if somewhat coextensive).”); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 
103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The TVPA . . . was intended to codify judicial decisions 
recognizing such a cause of action under the Alien Tort Claims Act.” (citation omitted)), 
abrogated in part by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011); Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV. 8386 (KMW), 2002 WL 319887, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 
2002) (“[N]o court . . . since the enactment of the TVPA has held that the TVPA in any way 
preempts ATCA claims for torture and extrajudicial killings.”). 
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II.  THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF “INDIVIDUAL” UNDER THE 
TVPA 
A.  The Name Game: Persons, Human Beings, and Individuals 
Although the TVPA helped ameliorate confusion regarding appropriate 
causes of action under the ATCA, the language of the TVPA raised an 
important new question: do corporations qualify as “individuals” subject to 
liability under the Act?121  
The term “individual”—used to describe human beings—is sometimes 
distinguished from “persons,” which includes both natural bodies and non-
living entities.122  However, in Clinton v. City of New York, the Supreme Court 
held that the term “individual” may also include “persons.”123  Clinton 
involved challenges to the Line Item Veto Act, which granted the President 
authority to veto portions of a bill.124  The jurisdictional provision of the Act 
allowed “individuals” to file suit.125  The Supreme Court looked to legislative 
intent for guidance on how to interpret this term, and found that “individual” 
was not meant to exclude corporate plaintiffs or “persons.”126  Although some 
courts have adopted Clinton’s reasoning and held that corporations qualify as 
“individuals” under the TVPA, others have continued to make distinctions 
between the meanings of the two terms.127  
B.  The TVPA Applies Only to Human Beings: The Second Circuit Approach128 
In Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, victims of South African apartheid 
sued corporations for violations of international law under the ATCA and 
TVPA.129  Plaintiffs claimed that the corporate defendants had allied with the 
                                                 
 121. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 122. See Joseph Vining, The Mystery of the Individual in Modern Law, 52 VILL. L. REV. 1, 
12 (2007). 
 123. 524 U.S. 417, 428 (1998) (pointing to Congress’s intent for “the word ‘individual’ to be 
construed as synonymous with the word ‘person’”). 
 124. See id. at 421, 436–37; Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), 
invalidated by Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421.  The Supreme Court found that the Act, which essentially 
allowed the president to cancel portions of a bill without presentment to both houses of Congress, 
was unconstitutional.  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421, 445–46. 
 125. Line Item Veto Act, § 3(a)(1); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428 (permitting “any individual 
adversely affected” to file a claim). 
 126. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429. 
 127. See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (rejecting the characterization of corporations as “individuals”). 
 128. The D.C. and Ninth Circuits have also followed this approach.  However, the D.C. 
Circuit did not elaborate on its ruling and the Ninth Circuit’s decision was based primarily on 
construing the term “individual” consistently throughout the statute.  See Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., No. 09-7125, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 13934, at *136–37 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011); Bowoto 
v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 129. 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), aff’d sub nom. by an equally divided 
court Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008). 
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South African government to perpetuate a racially oppressive system of 
apartheid against black Africans.130 
The Second Circuit dismissed the TVPA claim because the plaintiffs failed 
to link any of the defendants to state action.131  Judge Edward R. Korman, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, explained that “individual” generally 
means “human being”—a term that applies to natural persons and thus 
excludes corporations.132  He further reasoned that the TVPA uses the term 
“individual” to describe potential victims and defendants, and “only natural 
persons can be the ‘individual’ victims of acts that inflict ‘severe pain and 
suffering.’”133  Thus, Judge Korman concluded that the term must be construed 
similarly in both portions of the statute, and rejected corporate liability under 
the TVPA.134 
Similarly, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., the court dismissed an 
Indonesian resident’s TVPA claim against a corporation for alleged human 
rights violations and genocide.135  Considering various definitions of 
“individual,” the court found that the term generally excludes classes and 
institutions, and accordingly did not include corporations.136  The court 
                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 260. 
 132. Id. at 324 (Korman, J., concurring in part) (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).  The D.C. Circuit has also denied corporate 
liability under the TVPA, simply stating that “the plain reading of the statute strongly suggests 
that it only covers human beings, and not corporations.”  Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 
2d 20, 28 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, No. 09-7125, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
13934 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011).  Although the D.C. Circuit’s 2011 decision upheld the dismissal 
of a TVPA claim against the corporation, it acknowledged that a corporation can be liable for 
aiding and abetting under the ATS.  Doe, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13934, at *84. 
 133. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 323 (Korman, J., concurring in part) (emphasis added) (quoting 
In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 56); see also Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 
F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (acknowledging the TVPA’s employ of “individual” to 
describe both defendants and victims, and stating that “[t]he Court does not believe it would be 
possible for corporations to be tortured or killed.  The Court also does not believe it would be 
possible for corporations to feel pain and suffering”); Friedman v. Bayer Corp., No. 99-CV-3675, 
1999 WL 33457825, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1999) (granting the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s TVPA claims, which alleged that the defendants collaborated with Nazi 
Germany to commit crimes such as torture and slave labor against the plaintiffs for several 
reasons, including the fact that TVPA claims are generally applied only to individual defendants). 
 134. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 323–24 (Korman, J., concurring in part) (quoting In re Agent 
Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d, at 56). 
 135. 969 F. Supp. 362, 365, 384 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).  The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the TVPA claim for pleading insufficiencies 
and did not reach the issue of corporate liability under the TVPA.  Beanal, 197 F.3d at 169. 
 136. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382 (defining “individual” as “‘a single person as distinguished 
from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from 
a partnership, corporation, or association . . . it may, in proper cases, include a corporation.’” 
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1996))).  Moreover, in Jove Engineering, Inc. 
v. IRS, the Eleventh Circuit rationalized that the term “individual” in the Bankruptcy Code does 
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reasoned that this construction of “individual” did not conflict with the 
legislative intent of the Act, as Congress did not address corporate liability 
when drafting the TVPA, but instead chose the term “individual” to ensure 
foreign states could not be liable under the Act.137  
C.  The TVPA Holds “Persons” Liable: The Eleventh Circuit Approach 
In Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Alabama held that corporations could be liable 
under the TVPA,138 and rejected the Beanal court’s analysis in favor of the 
reasons provided in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.139  The Rodriquez court 
found that the TVPA must permit actions against corporations absent explicit 
exclusion by Congress.140  The court cited Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,141 
which had determined that “‘individual’ is synonymous with ‘person.’”142  
Therefore, the court held that because corporations are “generally viewed the 
same as a person . . . it is reasonable to conclude that had Congress intended to 
exclude corporations from liability under the TVPA, it could and would have 
expressly stated so.”143  
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Rodriquez holding that corporations could 
be held liable under the TVPA in Romero v. Drummond Co.144  Subsequently 
in Sinaltrainal, while only briefly addressing the corporate question, the 
Eleventh Circuit relied on Romero to affirm to the district court’s holding.145 
III.  APPLYING THE TVPA TO CORPORATE DEFENDANTS: A SHOWING OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
The Eleventh Circuit’s consideration of the ATCA and its role in framing 
and passing the TVPA provides a more well-reasoned analysis of the 
                                                                                                                 
not pertain to corporate defendants based on ordinary definitions of the term “individual.”  92 
F.3d 1539, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1996)). 
 137. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 382 (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249, at *7 (1991)). 
 138. 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1267 (N.D. Ala. 2003). 
 139. See id. at 1266–67. 
 140. Id. at 1267. 
 141. See id. at 1266–67 (citing Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003), aff’d in part, vacated in part by Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th 
Cir. 2009)). 
 142. Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1358–59 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 428 (1998)).  In Clinton, the court equated “individual” to “person,” which broadly 
encompasses “‘corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships . . . as well as 
individuals.’”  Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428 n.13 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
 143. Sinaltrainal, 256 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
 144. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 
ATCA does not provide an exception for corporations). 
 145. Sinaltrainal, 578 F.3d 1252, 1264 n.13 (“Under the law of this Circuit, the Torture Act 
allows suits against corporate defendants.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Romero, 
552 F.3d at 1315)). 
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congressional intent underlying the TVPA than that of the Second Circuit.146  
Although both courts look to the ATCA for legislative history, the Eleventh 
Circuit bases its decision on a more accurate understanding of the torture 
legislation’s relationship to the earlier act.147 
A.  Corporate Defendants Under the ATCA 
The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning accurately reflects the complementary 
nature of the TVPA to the ATCA, and Congress’s intent to expand the prior 
legislation using the TVPA.148  As articulated by Romero, plaintiffs may 
permissibly bring a claim against corporations under the ATCA for aiding and 
abetting.149  Because the TVPA’s purpose is to expand the ATCA, corporations 
must also be liable under the Act.150  Furthermore, at the time of the TVPA’s 
enactment in 1991, corporate actors had already been subject to liability under 
the ATCA.151  Given Congress’s awareness that corporate actors were subject 
to suit under the act that Congress enacted the TVPA to expand, one must 
conclude that if Congress had intended to exclude corporations from TVPA 
liability, it would have explicitly done so.  Although the Beanal court 
conceded that the TVPA expands the ATCA,152 its decision effectively allowed 
an entire group of defendants who would be subject to claims under the ATCA 
to avoid liability under the TVPA.153  
B.  Exclusion of Foreign States from Liability 
In Beanal, the district court attempted to support the exclusion of 
corporations from liability by finding that the legislators’ choice of the term 
“individual” “was not inadvertent,” and concluding that corporations should 
not be liable under the plain reading of the word.154  However, in its analysis, 
the court acknowledged that Congress chose this word to exclude foreign states 
                                                 
 146. See id. at 1263–64; Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246, 
1250–52 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 147. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 148. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 149. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315. 
 150. See supra Part I.B.3; see also Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 
1250, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“[B]ecause corporations can be sued under the ATCA and 
Congress did not explicitly exclude corporations from liability under the TVPA, private 
corporations are subject to liability under the TVPA.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Carmichael v. United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113–114, 115 (5th Cir. 
1988) (assuming that the ATCA provides subject-matter jurisdiction over corporations that 
participate in official torture, but finding insufficient evidence of Prince Waterhouse’s 
involvement in his incarceration and torture). 
 152. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 197 
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 153. See id. (acknowledging that Congress’s use and the court’s interpretation of “individual” 
may have the effect of excluding corporations from liability unintentionally). 
 154. Id. 
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from liability.155  This undermines the court’s position because it evidences 
that legislators had specifically considered which parties to shield from 
liability, and chose not to extend any such protection to corporations.156 
Furthermore, with regard to the state-action requirement, one Senate report 
noted that the TVPA “does not cover purely private criminal acts by 
individuals or nongovernmental organizations.”157  By referencing individuals 
and nongovernmental organizations as parties that could be liable under the 
Act, the Senate report implies that an organization could be held liable under 
the TVPA if its actions were under “color of law.”158  
The report also noted that “[t]he legislation is limited to lawsuits against 
persons who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the torture.”159  By using 
“persons” interchangeably with “individuals,” the report suggests that 
legislators did not intend to limit the scope of the Act by using the term 
“individual.”160  
C.  Objects of Torture 
In Khulumani, Judge Korman noted that because the TVPA’s language uses 
“individual” to refer to perpetrators as well as victims of torture, the term 
should have the same meaning in both contexts.161  Therefore, because only 
humans can be victims of torture, the court narrowly construed the term 
“individual” to mean “natural persons” in both parts of the statute.162  
In making this determination, Judge Korman applied the rationale from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,163 in which the Court 
reasoned that the term “demonstrates” must have the same meaning in two 
separate sections of a statute.164  The Court stated, “[a]bsent some 
                                                 
 155. Id.; see S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (1991) (“The legislation uses the term ‘individual’ to 
make crystal clear that foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any 
circumstances: only individuals may be sued.”). 
 156. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7 (indicating only that the legislature did not intend to “turn 
the U.S. courts into tribunals for torts having no connection to the United States whatsoever” 
(emphasis added)). 
 157. Id. at 8. 
 158. See id.; supra Part I.B.2. 
 159. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 160. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (broadly defining “person” to include business organizations as well 
as individuals); see supra text accompanying notes 122–27. 
 161. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2007) (Korman, J., 
concurring), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 
U.S. 1028 (2008). 
 162. See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 323–24 (Korman, J., concurring); see also Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003). 
 164. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101 (construing the statutory language under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate based on sex). 
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congressional indication to the contrary, we decline to give the same term in 
the same act a different meaning depending on whether the rights of the 
plaintiff or the defendant are at issue.”165  
However, unlike the statute at issue in Desert Palace, the TVPA’s legislative 
record provides sufficient indication that Congress did not intend to limit the 
class of defendants by referring to possible plaintiffs as “individuals.”166  
Moreover, applying this reasoning to the TVPA ignores the obvious—although 
a corporation cannot feel pain, it can certainly help inflict it.167  Actions taken 
by a corporation to aid and abet torture are no less serious than those taken by 
human beings, despite the fact that corporations themselves cannot be victims.  
IV.  CORPORATE DEFENDANTS: ESSENTIAL TO CARRY OUT OBJECTIVES OF THE 
TVPA 
A.  Bridging the ATCA Gap 
In Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., the Eleventh Circuit stated that 
“neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has urged [courts] to read the TVPA 
as narrowly as . . . the [ATCA] generally.”168  As the Aldana court points out, 
there seems to be no reason or authority for courts to limit the scope of the 
TVPA beyond that of the ATCA by shielding corporations from liability under 
the Act. 
Although most courts recognize that claims against corporations for torture 
may be brought under the ATCA, for liability to attach, the corporate violator 
must commit torture as defined by the “law of nations”—an ever-changing 
concept.169  This restriction presents a factual hurdle to plaintiffs alleging 
                                                 
 165. Id. (emphasis added). 
 166. See supra Part I.B.3; Part III.A–B. 
 167. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement 
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 188 (2002) (discussing Doe v. Unocal Corp., and 
noting “[t]here is little question that thousands of Burmese villagers were impressed to perform 
labor for the benefit of Unocal’s pipeline project”); Seher Khawaja, Note, Corporate Free Market 
Responsibility: Addressing Rights Violations with a Fiduciary Duty Approach to Natural 
Resource Extractions in Weak Governance Zones, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 185,  
189–90, 194 (2008) (highlighting human-rights violations by corporations seeking natural 
resources and observing that the ATCA and TVPA provide some relief for some of the 
“egregious violations that have occurred at the hands of extractive industries”). 
 168. 416 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
 169. See supra Part I.A.1 and accompanying notes.  Torture, as an international violation, has 
been defined by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him . . . intimidating or coercing him or . 
. . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
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crimes against humanity—an obstacle that the TVPA is intended to remedy.170  
The language of the TVPA and its explicit definition of torture and 
extrajudicial killing are not intended to exclude defendants such as 
corporations, but to expand on the human-rights violations for which plaintiffs 
may seek remedies.171 
The TVPA can also be used to compensate plaintiffs for human-rights 
abuses if other federal appellate courts decide to follow the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Kiobel and deny corporate liability under the ATCA.172  It is 
essential that courts permit TVPA suits against corporations so that natural 
persons who commit acts of torture cannot escape liability by hiding behind a 
corporate entity.173 
B.  Deterring Torture: A National Objective 
As a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the United States has 
committed itself to preventing torture.174  In a letter seeking the Senate’s 
                                                                                                                 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
G.A. Res. 3946, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (Dec. 10, 
1984). 
 170. See Rachel Bart, Note, Using the American Courts to Prosecute International Crimes 
Against Women: Jane Doe v. Radovan Karadzic and S. Kadic v. Radovan Karadzic, 3 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 467, 476 (1996) (explaining that the TVPA was “enacted in reaction to the 
extreme narrowing” of the ATCA and is meant to negate limitations Tel-Oren placed on torture 
liability under the ATCA). 
 171. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (“The 
TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action that has been 
successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the 
Alien Tort Claims Act) . . . .”). 
 172. See supra notes 84–88; Christopher Tansey, Kiobel Decision Significantly Limits 
Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Oct. 11, 2010), 
http://hrbrief.org/2010/10/kiobel-decision-significantly-limits-corporate-liability-for-human-
rights-violations/ (addressing the implications of the Kiobel decision and observing that it “will 
significantly limit legal recourse available to victims of human rights abuses attributable to a 
corporate entity”). 
 173. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 174. See G.A. Res. 3946, supra note 169.  The Convention mandates that participating states 
“take effective measures to prevent torture within their borders, and forbids states to return people 
to their home country if there is reason to believe they will be tortured.”  The United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
GLOB. GOVERNANCE WATCH, http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/human_rights/the-united-
nations-convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading-treatment-or-
punishment (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).  But see Philippe Sands, Forward to THE TORTURE 
MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE, at IX (David Cole ed., 2009) (“The torture has 
deeply damaged the reputation of the U.S., a country that has done more than any other to 
promote the idea of the rule of international law.”); Aisha Fili, Torture Claims Against the United 
States and its Effect on US Foreign Policy, EXAMINER (Sept. 1, 2010), 
http://www.examiner.com/foreign-policy-in-detroit/torture-claims-against-the-united-states-and-
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advice and consent for ratification of the Convention, President Ronald Reagan 
wrote, “[r]atification of the Convention by the United States will clearly 
express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice unfortunately 
still prevalent in the world today.”175 
Through acts such as the TVPA, the United States continues to uphold a 
strong stance against torture while emphasizing the importance of human 
rights.176  The TVPA gives “notice to individuals engaged in human rights 
violations that the United States strongly condemns such acts and will not 
shelter human rights violators from being accountable in appropriate 
proceedings.”177  Rep. Gus Yatron, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Human 
Rights and International Organizations for the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that the TVPA ensures “in the United 
States, the individuals who have tortured will be held accountable, and the 
victims will be compensated in part for what they have endured.”178  
1.  Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
Chemical attacks, such as those giving rise to claims in Aziz v. Republic of 
Iraq, cannot be executed without components manufactured by companies 
such as Alcolac.179  Turning a blind eye to corporations that provide terrorists 
with the equipment to commit heinous war crimes undermines the United 
States’ strict stance against terrorism.180  Furthermore, holding corporations 
                                                                                                                 
its-effect-on-the-us-foreign-policy (discussing the United States’ war on terrorism and the 
allegations of torture conducted by the United States against prisoners and detainees). 
 175. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Message from the President of the United States, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 100-20 (1988). 
 176. See TVPA Hearing and Markup, supra note 116 (statement of Father Robert Drinan on 
behalf of the American Bar Association). 
 177. Correale, supra note 13, at 220 (quoting Matthew H. Murray, The Torture Victim 
Protection Act: Legislation to Promote Enforcement of the Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. 
Courts, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 714 (1987)). 
 178. TVPA Hearing and Markup, supra note 116, at 1 (statement of Rep. Gus Yatron, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations).  Although the Act 
“set[s] an example for other nations to follow,” it also helps solidify the “United States’ 
commitment to protecting torture victims, ensuring their adequate compensation, and 
guaranteeing that the United States does not become a sanctuary for international torturers.”  
Haffke, supra note 12, at 1479 (footnote omitted). 
 179. See Aziz v. Republic of Iraq, No. MJG-09-869, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 143164, at *2–5 
(D. Md. June 9, 2010), aff’d, No. 10-1908, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19227 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 
2011). 
 180. See supra notes 173–78 and accompanying text.  The Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism is responsible for the development and enactment of counterterrorism policies.  
See Department Organization, U.S. DEPARTMENT ST., http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls 
/dos/436.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).  These U.S. anti-terrorism policies have influenced 
other countries to recognize the crime of terrorism. see also Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Testimony to the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, in 1 
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liable under the TVPA will enable victims of torture to receive adequate 
compensation, as corporations have resources far beyond that of other 
individuals who may be sued under the Act.181 
Corporate faculties also raise problems for countries attempting to curtail 
torture because corporations represent “powerful global actors that some states 
lack the resources or will to control.”182  In such cases, legislation such as the 
TVPA provides an additional deterrent to corporations who may otherwise 
violate individual human rights.183  
2.  Corporations Incentivized to Avoid Liability  
Fear of liability creates a strong incentive for companies to monitor their 
business practices,184 and motivates corporations to hire workers who will 
minimize the company’s liabilities.185  Corporate shareholders play a key role 
in this, as their primary concern is to protect their interest in the corporation by 
avoiding costly litigation or settlements.186  
C.  Limits to Corporate Accountability 
Before corporations may be held liable, there must be a certain mens rea 
showing.  Without such a requirement, corporations would face liability for 
                                                                                                                 
EVOLUTION OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 203, 206 (Yonah Alexander & Michael B. 
Kraft eds., 2008). 
 181. See, e.g., Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, Abstract, International 
Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 245 (2004) (suggesting ATCA 
claims against corporations escalated due to the “deep pockets” of such defendants). 
 182. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 
111 YALE L.J. 443, 461 (2001) (discussing the necessity for corporate responsibility for 
preventing human-rights violations). 
 183. Cf. id. at 533–34 (explaining how regulatory schemes and litigation can reduce the 
likelihood that corporations will violate human rights). 
 184. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual and Corporate Issues, 
53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (2002) (observing that vicarious liability incentivizes corporations to 
exact a higher level of care in hiring decisions so to avoid liability); see also Ratner, supra note 
182, at 473 (discussing the economic rationales for holding corporations liable for the conduct of 
their agents). 
 185. Epstein, supra note 184, at 1158; see also Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to Avoid Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While 
Simultaneously Building a Better Business Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 55, 58 (2009) (“[I]f 
publicly-traded multinational corporations wish to maintain high profit margins and continue to 
reap the benefits of globalization, they must implement sound Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) measures related to human rights . . . thereby . . . enabling corporations to avoid the costs 
of both ATS litigation and reputational harm.”). 
 186. Ratner, supra note 182, at 473 (observing that placing liability on corporations, rather 
than individuals, is more effective at determining “undesireable conduct” for a variety of reasons, 
but in particular “because corporate liability encourages shareholders to monitor corporate 
actions”). 
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supplying or producing any item eventually used to inflict torture.187  When 
imposing liability under the TVPA for aiding and abetting in torture or 
extrajudicial killing, courts should require plaintiffs to establish that a 
corporate defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that its actions 
would result in the alleged violation.188  A knowledge standard would 
influence corporations to exhibit a higher level of care in its transactions than 
would a purposeful mens rea requirement, which some courts have applied.189  
Under a knowledge standard, plaintiffs suing a corporation for aiding and 
abetting in torture under the TVPA would not need to prove that the 
corporation shared the mens rea of the actor, but only that the corporation 
knew a crime would likely occur and intentionally facilitated the act.190  
Instead of yielding deterrent effects, a purposeful mens rea requirement would 
actually provide greater protection to global corporations that expand to areas 
with high rates of human-rights atrocities, thereby enabling corporations to 
ignore the sociological impact of their businesses.191 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Corporations qualify as “individuals” under the Torture Victim Protection 
Act and should be held accountable for aiding and abetting in the violation of 
human rights.  The Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress created the 
TVPA to expand the Alien Tort Claims Act, under which corporations were 
                                                 
 187. See Teddy Nemeroff, Note, Untying the Khulumani Knot: Corporate Aiding and 
Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act After Sosa, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
231, 284 (2008). 
 188. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining the mens rea 
requirements as “actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable) knowledge that the accomplice’s actions 
will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime”), vacated en banc, 395 F.3d 978, (9th 
Cir. 2003); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The 
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international law required a mens rea standard of knowledge “that its actions will substantially 
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at 262.  But see Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (determining that the mens rea necessary for aiding and abetting under international 
law standards required purpose, not knowledge, allowing for greater culpability), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 79 (2010).  The TVPA itself also limits liability to individuals who act “under actual or 
apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation[.]”  Torture Victim Protection Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(a), 106 Stat. 73, 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note 
(2006)). 
 189. See Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d at 259; Abecassis v. Wyatt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 623, 
655 (S.D. Tex. 2010); see also Nemeroff, supra note 187, at 284 (discussing mens rea under the 
ATCA and noting that “[p]roving ‘purposeful’ conduct is difficult with regard to corporate action 
abroad”). 
 190. Doe, 395 F.3d at 950–51. 
 191. See Nemeroff, supra 187, at 284. 
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proper defendants. Therefore, excluding corporations from liability under the 
TVPA contradicts the Act’s purpose.  Furthermore, Congress chose not to 
explicitly bar corporate liability under the TVPA, which was enacted after 
lawsuits against corporations under the ATCA had commenced.  Recent 
challenges to the ATCA’s applicability to corporate defendants provide an 
even greater incentive to allow corporate liability under the TVPA.  Without 
the TVPA as an avenue to hold corporations liable, courts will be unable to 
fulfill the legislators’ intent of deterring torture and providing just 
compensation to victims of these heinous acts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
